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Abstract
Models of nomination politics in the US often nd "gridlock" in equilibrium
because of the super-majority requirement in the Senate for the conrmation of
presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers to defeat any nomi-
nee. Yet empirically nominations are successful. In the present paper we explore
the possibility that senators can be induced to vote contrary to their nomi-
nal (gridlock-producing) preferences through contributions from the president
and/or lobbyists, thus breaking the gridlock and conrming the nominee. We
model contributions by the president and lobbyists according to whether payment
schedules are conditioned on the entire voting prole, the vote of a senator, or
the outcome. We analyze several extensions to our baseline approach, including
the possibility that lobbyists may nd it more productive to o¤er inducements
to the president in order to a¤ect his proposal behavior, rather than trying to
induce senators to vote for or against a given nominee.
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1 Introduction
Models of preference-based voting in committees and elections have a long and distin-
guished pedigree. The spatial model, borrowed from Hotelling (1929) and popularized
by Downs (1957) and Black (1958), is now well established in the political economy
lexicon. In its most essential form, the space of alternatives is the unit interval and
agents are assumed to possess symmetric, strictly single-peaked preferences on [0,1]
with xi the ith agents ideal point. In its simplest application, two candidates (or mo-
tions) are pitted against each other and the one securing the most votes from agents
wins.1 The well-known equilibrium result for this class of problems Blacks Median
Voter Theorem states that the alternative closer to xm, the ideal point of the median
voter, will win the contest. As a consequence, movers of motions or nominators of
candidates who want to win will converge in their proposals to xm.
Institutions, however, often possess additional features constraining the operation
of pure majority rule. In the present paper we wish to take up one of the more
prominent examples the use of supermajority procedures in legislatures like the U.S.
Senate. From the seminal work of Krehbiel (1998) it is well known that when a
motion requires a supermajority to pass, it may not be possible to alter an existing
status quo.2 If, for example, 60 votes are required in a 100-person legislature to pass
a particular motion, then any coalition of 41 may block this motion. For some status
quo positions, there may exist no motion able to overcome this obstacle. Krehbiel
calls the gridlock region the range of prospective status quo points which cannot be
dislodged when a specic supermajority rule is in e¤ect. We are interested in what
happens when gridlock is imminent. Are there ways in which enough agents can be
induced to vote contrary to their nominal preferences to break out of the gridlock?
1All of these features may be complicated (multidimensional space, multicandidate contests, plu-
rality or supermajority rules, etc.), but we will begin with the stripped-down arrangement and add
some complications shortly.
2When a simple-majority procedure is in use, xm is the only status quo for which this statement
holds.
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1.1 Context
Although this question may be posed in general settings, we have a specic one in mind.
In the constitutional order of the United States, the Supreme Court is one of the three
branches of government that makes policy, not through legislation or executive edicts
but rather through its rulings. On a case before the Court, each justice makes two
decisions. The rst, called the vote on the merits, is a decision on whether to a¢ rm or
reverse a ruling from a lower court. A plurality in favor of reversal is decisive; a tie or
smaller vote a¢ rms the earlier ruling. The vote on the merits a¤ects only the parties in
dispute and, for this reason, is often of little importance for public policy.3 The second
decision is each justices opinion, giving the statutory or constitutional rationale for
his or her vote on the merits. In principle, each justice may write a separate opinion.
Often, groups of justices sign a common opinion after having bargained over opinion
language. The Courts rationale becomes binding on lower courts, a¤ecting their
disposition of similar cases in the future and hence taking on broader public policy
signicance, if there is majority agreement.4 Thus, the strategic policy process on the
Court is one in which the question arises of whether there exists a majority consensus
on moving the status quo to some new policy. Inasmuch as the Court is a nine-person
body, if policy may be represented as unidimensional, and if justices have single-peaked
preferences, then the policy preference of the median justice (that is, his or her ideal
language and rationale for a majority opinion) will prevail.
Imagine, now, a death or retirement of a justice. The eight-person Court continues
to function, but without a unique median. Rather, bargaining takes place among
justices with an outcome forecast to lie between the ideal of the fourth and fth justices.
If the status quo policy lies in this interval, it cannot be revised since no coalition of
3However, when the United States is a party to the suit, a decision on the merits can have signi-
cance, even if a Court majority does not agree on a constitutional rationale.
4This occurs if a majority of justices sign the same opinion. It also occurs, even if separate
opinions are drafted, if a majority of them share common agreements (though they may di¤er in other
respects).
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ve justices will agree to a change; if it lies outside this interval, on the other hand,
bargaining is assumed to bring it inside the interval (Snyder and Weingast, 2000;
Krehbiel, 2004, 2005; Rohde and Shepsle, 2006).
While this is the forecast for the surviving eight-person Court, the departure of
a justice is a nomination inducing event in which the president may propose a new
justice to the Court who, if conrmed, will generate a newly dened median in the
full-complement, nine-person Court. Conrmation requires the "advice and consent"
of the Senate. Nominally, this is a simple majority requirement. But the U.S. Senate
has an unusual procedure known as the principle of unlimited debate. In order to
end debate on a motion in this case the motion to conrm a presidential nominee
and move directly to a vote, cloture must be secured, and this requires an absolute
supermajority of sixty votes.5 Any group of 41 senators may keep the Senate from
voting on conrmation by blocking cloture. This leads to the possibility of gridlock
in which any nominee preferred by the president (because of the policy forecast for
the full nine-member Court) is opposed by at least 41 senators, and the status quo
outcome of the eight-member Court is preferred by the president to any nominee 60 or
more senators would support (if any).
There are several models of this strategic interaction between president, Senate,
and Court. We shall elaborate one by Rohde and Shepsle (2006) shortly. Many of
these models nd that gridlock obtains under a wide range of conditions. A fortiori, as
politics in America has grown more polarized (in a manner that will be made precise),
the set of circumstances in which gridlock prevails has grown wider. In the present
paper we explore a set of options available to the president and special interest groups
to o¤er inducements to senators to vote contrary to their nominal preferences, thereby
cutting the Gordian knot and breaking the gridlock.
5This rule (Senate Rule 22) has been in e¤ect since 1975. Between 1917 and 1975 cloture was
obtained with the support of two-thirds of those present and voting. Before 1917, there was no rule
to end debate short of unanimous consent.
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1.2 Model of Supreme Court Appointments
Rohde and Shepsle (2006) begin with a policy space, [0,1], along which are arrayed
the ideal points of the one hundred senators, Ss. The ideal point of the president,
P, is placed at an extreme location, mainly for ease of presentation. (All results,
appropriately adjusted, apply for a more moderate president.) The senators and the
president possess symmetric, strictly single-peaked utility functions on [0,1]. Some
of their ideal points are displayed in Figure 1. In particular, S41 and S60 dene the
gridlock region. For any status quo located in [S41,S60], no alternative is preferred to
it by 60 or more senators. If r is such a status quo (or reversion point), then any move
to the left is opposed at a minimum by all senators at or to the right of S60 forty-one
in all and any move to the right is opposed at a minimum by all senators at or to
the left of S41.
Figure 1. Gridlock Region.
A Court resignation or death a nomination-inducing event leaves an eight-person
Court in place. Let r be the commonly anticipated policy position of this Court (the
result of bargaining the details of which we suppress here).6 Any nomination by the
president, if conrmed by the Senate, produces a nine-person Court with a well-dened
median whose ideal point will be the new Court policy position. Label this E. In
Figure 1, E is to the right of r, but its exact location is a function of the position
of the justice nominated by the president. The cut point between r and E, labeled
cp, partitions senators into those who prefer r to E and those who prefer E to r.
Since r lies in the gridlock region, this nominee cannot secure the sixty votes necessary
6See Snyder and Weingast (2000) and Krehbiel (2005) on how such bargaining takes place.
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for conrmation. In e¤ect, in voting on whether to conrm a presidential nominee,
senators compare r and E. They should not be seen as expressing a preference on the
nominees ideology except as it determines E.
From the analysis in Rohde and Shepsle (2006), the conditions for gridlock would
appear to be a commonplace. As American politics has become more polarized this
is reected in a "stretching" of the gridlock region with S41 pulled to the left and S60
to the right situations like that depicted in Figure 1 become even more common.
But presidents are not limited to proposing nominees. In addition, they may be
thought to possess an inducements budget consisting of divisible, targetable payments
to senators in exchange for their support. (We have in mind here earmarked appropri-
ations for state-specic projects, campaign contributions, presidential endorsements of
incumbents up for reelection, presidential support for pet bills of senators, etc.) And
the president is not the only agent with an inducements budget and an interest in
inuencing support for (or opposition to) a nominee. Special interests with resources
valuable to senators are active in the process. Indeed, in light of the availability of
inducements, the nomination itself is an endogenous product of more than the initial
policy preferences of senators and the reversion point of the eight-person Court fol-
lowing a departure of a justice. Protection, in the spirit of Grossman and Helpman
(1994), is not the only thing for sale.
The contribution of the current paper is to extend recent work that uncovers a wide
range of circumstances in which gridlock prevails. As a comparative static, the gridlock
potential has in all likelihood been exacerbated as the gridlock region has increased
with the growing polarization of representative institutions. We propose an approach,
borrowed frommodels of special interest lobbying, that provides conditions in which the
gridlock may be mitigated. Special interests, including the president himself, provide
the lubricant that "greases the skids" for successful nomination results.
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1.3 Overview of Results
We introduce a model in which both local lobbies and the president can o¤er induce-
ments. In particular, we will assume that the president is free to o¤er inducements to
any senator, while lobbies are senator-specic. Thus, the president and local lobbies
may be competing against each other. Groseclose and Snyder (1996) have shown that
buying a supermajority might be cheaper than buying a strict majority to prevent
counteractive lobbying. Taking a di¤erent modeling path, applying the methodology
of Console-Battilana (2005, 2006) and Dal Bo (2000, 2006), we nd that when induce-
ments can be made conditional on the entire voting prole, the president can defeat any
competing lobbies and secure the conrmation of his nominee by targeting a superma-
jority of votes, and can do so at no cost, i.e., no contributions are paid in equilibrium.
Dal Bo (2000) gives the rst intuition for this result. In his model a single lobby is
able to create a prisonersdilemma among voters by locking them into an equilibrium
in which no one is pivotal, and hence every voter will be willing to vote against her
preferred outcome for an innitesimally small contribution. (Since she is not pivotal
and cannot a¤ect the outcome, she would forego the contribution if she did not vote
against her preferred outcome.) We then explore other alternatives that still allow the
president to overcome the gridlock, but limit his ability to shift the policy outcome.
A key feature of our results is the importance of the "event" on which inducements
may be conditioned. We elaborate this below. In section 2 we describe the conventions
and maintained assumptions of our analysis. In section 3 we present our main results
in which the president and interest groups may o¤er inducements to senators to vote
in particular ways, where the inducements schedule is conditioned on the entire voting
prole. In section 4 we extend these results in three ways. We constrain inducement
schedules to those that only may be conditioned on an individual senators vote or,
alternatively, on the nal outcome (rather than the entire voting prole). We also
examine the possibility of interest groups focusing inducements on the nomination by
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the president rather than on the votes of senators. In section 5 we conclude. All proofs
of results are found in an appendix.
2 Contributions Models
2.1 Motivation
From casual empiricism, the hypothesis of pure policy voting by senators on Supreme
Court nominations appears to produce too many instances of gridlock in which
any nominee fails the conrmation test. Thus the theory implies that, following the
departure of a justice from the full Court, an eight-member Court remains in place.
Yet, a reduced Court is typically a temporary circumstance. So we want to identify
mechanisms by which the gridlock is overcome.7
2.2 Conventions
To proceed we use the following notation and conventions8:
 Senators are labeled by their ideal points, Ss, and ordered from left to right. The
libuster gridlock region is [S41; S60] there are 41 senators at or to the left of
S41 and there are 41 senators at or to the right of S60:
 The original nine-person Court is described by a left-to-right ordering of the
ideal points of the justices, fJ1; :::; J9g. The eight-person Court resulting from a
departure of one of the justices is an order-preserving relabeling, fJ1 ; :::; J8g.
 r represents the commonly anticipated (reversion) policy of the eight-person
Court after the departure of a justice from the original nine-person Court.
7Although a reduced court is a temporary aberration in the case of the Supreme Court, it is not
at all uncommon for vacancies in the lower federal courts to remain unlled, sometimes for years at a
time, owing to gridlock in the Senate (which must conrm such appointments).
8Throughout we assume, without loss of generality, that the presidents ideal policy lies to the right
of the gridlock region. A symmetric set of conventions may be written for a left-wing president and,
with small modications, for a moderate president. Nothing of substance is sacriced by restricting
things as we do.
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 JN is the presidents nominee.
 E is the (equilibrium) policy (forecast) of the nine-person Court if the presidents
nominee is conrmed. The upper bound of E is E.
 cp is the cut point between r and E: senators to the left of cp prefer r to E
whereas senators to the right of cp prefer E to r.
 s = CP is the rst senator with an ideal point to the left of or equal to cp, i.e.
SCP  cp.
 The president is a "he," a senator is a "she," and an interest group is an "it."
In words, there is a retirement on the Court. The eight-member Court remaining
is forecast to produce policy at r. If r is in the libuster gridlock region, any change
from r (through a new appointment) will be opposed by at least 41 senators so the
libuster prevents a vote on any presidential nominee. That is, for any nomination by
the president, and its equilibrium forecast for the Court, E (a function of the nominee),
this nominee will be opposed by at least 41 senators.
In order for the (conservative) president to succeed in having the Senate conrm a
nominee, producing new policy E(> r), he must induce each senator in fS41; :::; SCPg
to vote contrary to her policy preferences. If successful, the president can overcome
the libuster and move the policy outcome to the pivotal judge in the new nine-person
Court. As shown in Rohde and Shepsle (2006), regardless of how extreme the nominee
is, the most extreme pivotal judge will be the fth judge in the original eight-person
Court. We denote this upper bound as E, the furthest a president can move Court
policy with a successful appointment.9
We introduce two classes of agents who are in a position to attempt to inuence
senatorial voting. The president, in addition to nominating a candidate of a particular
9Proposition 0 of Rohde-Shepsle (2006) shows that E will be E if JN is to the right of the fth
justice on the eight-member court, and JN itself if he or she is the fth justice on the new Court.
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type, may be in a position to o¤er compensation to any of the one hundred senators.
Special interest groups (lobbyists), on the other hand, are assumed to be senator-
specic in the sense that each of them may attempt to inuence a specied senator
only.
The form that their respective o¤ers take, to be made precise below, is a menu
of payments to senators (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). This menu o¤ers payment
conditional on various events. We consider several alternatives: payments conditional
on the entire voting prole, on the particular vote of a senator, or on the nal outcome.
The rst takes the form "if senator s votes vs and the remaining prole of votes is
v s = (v1; :::; vs 1; vs+1;:::; v100), then her compensation is cs(v), where v = (vs; v s)."
The second takes the form "if senator s votes vs then her compensation is cs(vs)."
The nal contingency takes the form, "if the nominee is conrmed (rejected), then
the compensation for senator s is cs(E) [cs(r)]." We organize the analysis in terms of
the conditioning event and on whether the president alone, or the president together
with special interest groups, may o¤er compensation to senators for their votes. As
is seen below, we mainly emphasize conditioning on the entire prole, developing the
other possibilities as extensions. We will also explore in the section on extensions the
possibility that interest groups o¤er inducements to the president to nominate in a
manner they prefer, instead of bribing senators to vote as they prefer.
2.3 Maintained Assumptions
In order to avoid repeating contextual details of our models, we will maintain the
following unless explicitly revised:
 There are three types of agents: a president (P), one hundred senators (Ss), and
one hundred lobbies (ls), where s 2 f1; :::; 100g.
 Each lobby is associated with a specic senator (hence we refer to it as a local
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lobby).10 It may o¤er contributions to at most its own senator. (In some models
below lobbies are inactive and thus o¤er no contributions.)
 The president proposes a nominee (JN) and may also o¤er contributions to any
senator. (In some models below the president nominates only and may not o¤er
contributions.)
 The policy outcome is assumed to be a point in R. Each agent derives utility
from this outcome according to a symmetric and strictly single-peaked utility
function on R, written P (:); Ss(:);and Ls(:), for the president, senator s, and
lobbyist ls, respectively.11
 Each agent values policy and contributions additively.
 Every senator votes for or against the nominee. If sixty or more vote in favor,
the nominee is conrmed.
 The reversion policy outcome, upon a rejection of the presidents nominee, is r.
We normalize utilities so that P (r) = Ss(r) = Ls(r) = 0. We assume, without
loss of generality, that the presidents ideal policy lies to the right of r. For E  r,
if Ss(E) > 0 or Ls(E) > 0, we say that the senator or the lobby, respectively,
prefers E to r. If Ss(E) < 0 or Ls(E) < 0, we say the senator or the lobby prefers
the reversion policy. If Ss(E) = 0 or Ls(E) = 0, we say the senator or the lobby
is indi¤erent. (We do not assign any indi¤erence breaking rule.)
 Unless otherwise noted in the Equilibrium subsection, senators are ranked ac-
cording to Ss(E)  Ss+1(E).
10In Console-Battilana (2005, 2006), who focuses on international trade, the "local" lobbies are
unique to a particular nation, whereas transnational lobbies are able to inuence the representatives of
any nation. In the present paper we mean by "local" that a lobbyist is specic to a particular senators
state. (To simplify our analysis we assume that each of the senators from a state is associated with a
distinct lobbyist.)
11From symmetry it follows that preferences are monotonically decreasing in Euclidean distance
from the peak, or ideal point, of the utility function.
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 An alternative ranking will occasionally be used. It is dened by the mapping
LSs(E) = Ls(E)+Ss(E): For each E, order senators so that LSs(E)  LSs+1(E).
Note, forE 0 6= E 00 and two particular senators i and j, that we can have LSi(E 0) <
LSj(E
0) and LSi(E 00) > LSj(E 00), i.e., the ordering is not necessarily preserved
over E. Consider LS41(E), the function that maps E to the sum of the payo¤s
of the forty-rst senator and associated lobbyist. The identity of the forty-rst
senator and her lobbyist associated with di¤erent elements of the domain of E
may vary, so the function LS41(E) is not necessarily continuous. Furthermore,
by the earlier normalization assumption, LSs(r) = 0.
 We assume that the functions P (:); Ss(:);and Ls(:) are common knowledge, as
well as the location of the reversion point r and the policy E resulting from
proposal JN .
3 Contributions Conditional on Entire Voting Prole
3.1 Neither Lobbies nor the President O¤er Contributions
Before we begin our main analysis, we note that the setting in which no contributions
are possible from any agent is the original Rohde-Shepsle (2006) model. There the
president proposes a nominee to ll a vacancy, and senators vote according to their
preferences between r and E, the latter the median of the new nine-member Court
determined by conrmation of the presidential nomination.12 As observed earlier, in
this case there is often gridlock whenever r 2 [S41; S60] there is insu¢ cient support
to conrm the nominee.13 We now determine whether inducements from the president
and special interests can break the gridlock. We rst explore the impact of the president
alone. We then examine if the president has the same impact in the presence of local
12Technically it should be written E(JN ), since the median of the full nine-member court will depend
upon the location of the newly conrmed justice. We will normally not write this out in full, except
to avoid confusion, so E should be understood implicitly as a function of JN .
13There are other cases as well in which presidential preferences between E and r conict with those
of sixty or more senators for any choice of JN .
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lobbies o¤ering inducements to their respective senators to vote in a particular way.
Finally, we introduce an ideological cost to senators voting against their costituencys
preferences.
3.2 Only the President O¤ers Contributions
3.2.1 Strategy sets
In this section, only the president o¤ers inducements; thus there are no local lobbyists.
The strategies are as follows. The president proposes a nominee that results in policy
E if approved. In addition, the president may o¤er contributions to any senator s,
conditional on the entire voting prole, which we denote as cps : V ! R. Each
senator votes in favor or against the proposal, vs = 1 and vs = 0, respectively, i.e.,
vs : R! f0; 1g.
3.2.2 Stages of the game
Stage 1. Given a nomination-inducing event dening the reversion outcome r, the
president proposes a nominee that produces policy E if approved, and o¤ers a
schedule of contributions cps to senators. The contribution schedule is conditional
on the entire voting prole. E and cps are chosen to maximize the presidents
utility net of contributions. E and r are common knowledge.
Stage 2. In addition to E and r, each senator observes the contribution schedule
o¤ered to her only, and then votes. If strictly more than 40 senators vote against
JN , then r prevails. Otherwise, E is the equilibrium.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
We look for subgame perfect pure Nash equilibria, establishing our next claim.
Claim 1 If the president conditions contributions on the entire voting prole, there
are multiple equilibria but all share the following characteristic: the president obtains
his preferred policy E at zero cost.
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We provide some intuition here and defer the formal proof to the appendix. The
president contributes to multiple senators. To sixty-one senators he says, "For any
voting prole in which you vote for my nominee and are pivotal, I o¤er to compensate
you for any losses you might bear  that is, provide you with  Ss(E) if you prefer
r to E and thus Ss(E) < 0 plus " more. For any voting prole in which you are
not pivotal and vote for my nominee, I o¤er you ". If you vote against my nominee,
I give you nothing." Each senator o¤ered this contribution schedule has a dominant
strategy regardless of her personal utility: vote for the nominee. Hence, at least 61
senators will vote for the proposal. But then, none of them is pivotal in equilibrium,
and the president only has to pay each of them ". In equilibrium, " is vanishingly
small. This result relies on the ability of the president to recruit multiple senators
at the same time. The president is in e¤ect creating a prisonersdilemma. Senators
with Ss(E) < 0 would be better o¤ if r were chosen. However, in equilibrium they
are not pivotal, and hence they cannot a¤ect the outcome. They can be "recruited"
for " innitesimally small. The ability to contribute to multiple senators and at the
same time to condition contributions on the entire voting prole gives the president
the possibility of obtaining his rst-best outcome for free. Dal Bo (2000, 2006) and
Console-Battilana (2005, 2006) show a similar result in a di¤erent setting.14
3.3 Both Lobbyists and President O¤er Inducements
3.3.1 Strategy sets
Now we assume that each senator can receive contributions from a local lobby and the
president, both conditional on the voting prole. Therefore, the strategy space of each
lobby is cls : V  ! R, and the strategy space of the president is cps : V  ! R. Each
14Non-uniqueness of this equilibrium arises from the fact that the president can approach any sixty-
one or more senators. The result of Dal Bo is for a group of three committee members. His equilibrium
is unique because it entails a contributions schedule in which the unique coalition of all three members
is approached with an o¤er. We use the methodology of Console-Battilana [2006] to extend this result
to an arbitrarily sized committee.
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senator observes the contributions o¤ered to her by her local lobby and by the president.
(She does not observe o¤ers made to other senators.) Her objective is to maximize the
sum of personal policy utility plus contributions received. Hence, given additivity of
policy utility and contributions, senator ss strategy space is vs : R! f0; 1g:
3.3.2 The Game
Stage 1. Given a commonly known reversion policy r, the president proposes a
nominee that, if approved, will lead to commonly known policy E.
Stage 2. Simultaneously and non-cooperatively, the president and the local lobbies
o¤er contributions. The president o¤ers cvps to each senator, conditional on the
entire voting prole, while each local lobby ls contributes only to its corresponding
senator, cvls , also conditional on the entire voting prole.
Stage 3. Each senator observes the presidents nominee and the contributions o¤ered
to her and then votes. If more than 40 senators vote against JN , then r is
sustained. Otherwise, E results.
3.3.3 Equilibrium
We focus on subgame perfect pure Nash equilibrium but we employ a renement:
Equilibrium Renement: No senator is o¤ered positive contributions if she is not
pivotal, both on and o¤ the equilibrium path.
Claim 2 If local lobbies and the president condition contributions on the entire voting
prole, there exists an equilibrium in which a nominee yielding the policy outcome
preferred by the president, E, is proposed and approved, and the president pays zero
contributions. Furthermore, all equilibria must have these two properties under the
renement.
As before, we provide the formal proof in the appendix, giving only some intuition
here. Since we are looking for subgame perfect Nash equilibria, we solve the game
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backwards. For any proposal E there is always an equilibrium in which at least sixty-
one senators vote in favor of the proposal, each local lobby o¤ers zero for all voting
proles and the president o¤ers zero contribution to any senator for any voting prole.
No senator is pivotal, hence no senator has an incentive to deviate at stage 3 the
outcome would not change and her contributions would still be zero. No local lobby
can inuence the outcome, since its corresponding senator is not pivotal; hence no local
lobby has an incentive to deviate at stage 2. The president is obtaining his preferred
policy for free, so the president has no incentive to deviate at stage 2. Thus, in stage
1 the president can propose any nominee that yields E and it is approved. He has no
deviation as it would involve him proposing a nominee yielding a policy he prefers no
better.
An equilibrium with the property that the president obtains his preferred outcome
for free always exists. We now show that all equilibria under the renement possess
these properties. Consider any candidate equilibrium in which the president either pays
positive contributions or he does not obtain his preferred policy or both. The president
has a deviation from any such equilibrium. He can play a pivot strategy (dened below)
to induce strictly more than sixty senators to vote for his proposal, and pay each one
of them only a vanishingly small " > 0. In fact, for any candidate equilibrium, the
Equilibrium Renement implies that each senator is o¤ered no contribution from her
local lobby whenever she is not pivotal. Since no senator is pivotal, if the president
induces sixty-one senators to vote for the proposal, each one of these senators needs
only to be paid " > 0. If she is o¤ered " by the president to vote vs = 1, senator
s will do so since she receives " more in contributions than if she voted vs = 0, and
her personal utility is Ss(E) regardless of her vote since she is not pivotal. In e¤ect,
as long as the president can construct a contribution schedule for s such that vs = 1
is a dominant strategy for any possible voting prole, then he can create a prisoners
dilemma by o¤ering this schedule to sixty-one senators. Accordingly, the president
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will prevail, even if all lobbies and all senators are against his proposal.
For an outcome not satisfying either property described in Claim 2, we show that
the pivot strategy is a deviation, establishing that this candidate outcome cannot be
an equilibrium. The demonstration works as follows: the president targets a group of
sixty-one senators. Given any senator s, denote bc0;v sls as the contribution o¤ered by
lobby ls to senator s in the candidate equilibrium when vs = 0 and the other ninety-
nine senators vote according to prole v s. The president can play the following pivot
strategy with sixty-one senators:
v s vs Presidents Contribution cps
a) v s has strictly less than 59 voting 1 1 bc0;v sls + "
b) v s has exactly 59 voting 1 1 bc0;v sls + "+max[0; Ss(E)]
c) v s has strictly more than 59 voting 1 1 bc0;v sls + "
d) For any v s 0 0
Table 1. Pivot Strategy.
Informally, the president is constructing a schedule that says "No matter what you
are receiving to vote 0, I am always going to o¤er you " more to vote 1, and I will also
compensate you for your personal outcome-dependent utility loss if you are pivotal."
Here is the intuition for each circumstance displayed in the table:
a) If strictly less than 59 other senators vote 1, then senator s is non-pivotal.
Regardless of her vote, the outcome will be r and her personal outcome-dependent
payo¤ will be Ss(r) = 0. If she votes 0 the contribution o¤ered to her from lobby ls isbc0;v sls . The president however o¤ers bc0;v sls + "; hence voting 1 is indicated when strictly
less than 59 others vote 1.
b) If exactly 59 other senators vote 1, senator s is pivotal. If she votes 0 her payo¤
is Ss(r) = 0 plus any contribution she might receive from lobby ls. If she votes 1,
her personal payo¤ is given by Ss(E) plus any contribution she might receive. The
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president o¤ers bc0;v sls +max[0; Ss(E)]+" for any voting prole with exactly 59 others
voting 1. If Ss(E) < 0; the senator would have a net gain of " if she votes 1 rather
than voting 0, while she would have a net gain of Ss(E)+ " > 0 if Ss(E)  0 for voting
1 instead of 0. Hence, when exactly 59 other senators vote 1, senator s0s best response
is to vote 1.
c) If strictly more than 59 senators other than s vote 1, i.e. at least 60 senators
vote 1, then senator s is not pivotal, and the outcome is E regardless of her vote. If
she votes 0, senator s has a personal outcome-dependent utility Ss(E) and is o¤eredbc0;v sls in contributions to vote 0. If she votes 1, the personal outcome utility will still be
Ss(E) and the president additionally o¤ers bc0;v sls + ". Her net benet will be " higher
if she votes 1.
Therefore, given any voting prole, senator ss best response is to vote 1. We
had started by assuming there was a candidate outcome in which the president either
paid positive contributions or the presidents proposal was rejected. Since the president,
when deviating from this candidate outcome, plays the pivot strategy with 61 senators,
the president will actually have to pay only what he o¤ered in the case in which strictly
more than 59 senators vote 1 (row c in the table above). But in row c, the corresponding
bc0;v sls must be zero by the renement (otherwise the candidate outcome would not
have been consistent with the renement). Thus, if at least 60 other senators vote 1,
senator s is not pivotal. Therefore, when playing the pivot strategy with 61 senators,
the president obtains the approval of any proposed policy at a cost of 61".
But if this deviation by the president is possible, then no candidate outcome in
which the proposal of the president is rejected can be an equilibrium. If it were an
equilibrium, then there can be no deviation for the president. But, as we just demon-
strated, the president can play the pivot strategy with 61 senators and obtain his
preferred policy at a vanishingly small cost. Likewise, there can be no equilibrium
in which the president pays positive contributions, because the president could again
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deviate and play the pivot strategy with " small enough to reduce his contributions.
Therefore, even if we allow for the possibility of local lobbies, there always exists
an equilibrium in which the president proposes any nominee resulting in his preferred
policy E and it is approved at no cost to the president. Any nominee JN to the
right of the fth justice in the current eight-member Court produces this outcome.
Furthermore, from the Equilibrium Renement, we obtain that all equilibria possess
these properties.
This is a very strong result. Even if all lobbies and all senators dislike the presidents
nominee, the president can still manipulate the votes so that no one is pivotal, and
hence deny inuence to any local lobby or senator. Note also that this is true even
in very extreme cases. Consider for example a change from r to E that improves the
presidents utility by 1 and decreases the utility of each local lobby by 100; 000; 000.
The president will still be able to impose his preferred nominee at no cost.15 This raises
an interesting possibility.16 It would pay the lobbyists to focus on o¤ering inducements
to the president to refrain from o¤ering a nominee who would impose such large costs
on them. We address this possibility in the extensions section below.17
15Note that we are assuming a non-binding budget constraint. If a senator is pivotal in equilibrium,
the president can credibly commit to o¤er her more than the local lobby contribution plus her welfare
loss in order to vote 1. Each targeted senator plays vs = 1 in equilibrium because it is a dominant
strategy. It could very well be that more than 60 senators and their respective lobbies would be better
o¤ if they could cooperate. However, every single senator has a unilateral incentive to deviate from
such cooperation. In e¤ect the president has created a prisonersdilemma.
16We thank Torsten Persson for raising this possibility.
17We have also examined the case in which only local lobbies may o¤er inducements (to their
respective senators) to vote for or against the presidents nominee. The president has the power
to propose a nominee only. We show that in equilibrium the president nominates a candidate that
produces the policy outcome E closest to his ideal that leaves senator 41 and her lobbyist with
positive joint utility. Lobbies {l41; :::; l100} who derive positive utility from this equilibrium pay positive
contributions to their senators (if required to induce that senator to vote in favor), while all other
lobbies pay nothing. This nominee is conrmed. A precise statement of this claim and its proof are
available from the authors on request.
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3.4 Ideological Cost
For the case of the president conditioning contributions on the entire voting prole, we
have established that he can nominate any candidate, no matter how extreme. For an
eight-member court, fJ1 ; :::; J8g, any nominee-justice (JN) to the right of this Courts
fth justice (J5 ) establishes J

5 as the median of the full nine-member Court and, since
J5 = E, the best equilibrium available to the (conservative) president is achieved.
However, there may be an ideological cost for senators to support the presidents
nominee. That is, quite apart from the outcome (J5 ), constituents may disapprove
of their agent supporting a nominee not to their liking, even if their senator were not
pivotal. When facing re-election a senator whose constituency median is to the left of
cp may incur constituency unhappiness if she votes in favor of an extreme nominee to
the right. In e¤ect, constituents assess their agent on the basis of agent actions, so for
their assessment it only matters whether she voted in favor of the nominee or not. We
call this ideological cost, dening it as  I(JN   Ss). Each senator to the left of cp
(hence with Ss(E) < 0) incurs an ideological cost when voting for the nominee. This
cost is directly proportional to the distance between the ideal point of the proposed
nominee and the ideal point of senator s (the latter a measure of median constituent
preferences).18
We argue that the recruitment by the president of 61 votes will not come for free
anymore; the president will have to compensate senators in fS40; :::; SCPg for their
ideological loss  I(JN   Ss).19
Rather than targeting 61 senators and compensating a few for their ideological loss
(if any), the president could also choose to recruit only 60 votes. In this case, each of
18For tractability we assume that an ideological cost is borne only if a senator votes contrary to
his constituencys preference between r and E (and then it is proportional to the distance between
the nominee and the constituency ideal); no ideological cost is borne by senators who vote with their
constituency on this pairwise decision.
19We assume here that it is up to the president to compensate senators for the ideological costs they
bear. (If lobbyists could also do this, there are coordination issues that must be addressed, something
beyond the scope of the present paper.)
20
the 60 senators would be pivotal and thus each of them would have to be compensated
for ideological loss (if any), utility loss (if any), and the contributions (if any) o¤ered
by local lobbyists for a vote against the proposal (holding the remainder of the voting
prole xed). There are multiple equilibria. To keep things straightforward, we focus
on a (plausible) circumstance:
Assumption H1 : It is cheaper to compensate the 61 cheapest senators for their ide-
ological cost (if any) rather than compensating 60 pivotal senators for their ideological
cost, their utility loss, and their contributions loss.
3.4.1 Model
The set up is the same as in section 3.3, except that now we add the prospect of
ideological cost for senators. As before, each senator derives utility from contributions
received given the equilibrium voting prole (cps and cls), and from the personal utility
which depends on the outcome (Ss(E)). However, in addition senators in fS1; :::; SCPg
face an ideological cost of  I(JN   Ss) when voting in favor of the proposal.
3.4.2 Equilibrium
We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria with the renement that no contributions
are o¤ered to non-pivotal legislators by local lobbies.
Claim 3 Under Assumption H1, in equilibrium the president proposes JN=argmaxJ [P (E(J)) 
CPP
s=40
I(J  Ss)], senators fS40; :::; S100g vote for the proposal, senators fS1; :::; S39g vote
against, the president pays I(JN   Ss) to senators in fS40; :::; SCPg, and zero to all
other senators. No nominee to the right of J5 will ever be proposed by the president.
There exists an equilibrium in which the president pays I(JN   Ss) to senators in
fS40; :::; SCPg and no one has an incentive to deviate. No senator has an incentive
to deviate in stage three. Since no senator is pivotal, she would have the same
personal utility regardless of her vote, would receive zero contributions from local
lobbies regardless of her vote and, for senators S40 through SCP , will be compensated
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by the president for her ideological loss if she votes in favor of the proposal. The
lobbies have no incentive to deviate in stage two, because no senators are pivotal and
therefore cannot inuence the outcome. The president has no incentive to deviate in
stage two. This is because each senator with Ss(E) < 0 incurs an ideological cost from
voting vs = 1 regardless of whether her vote inuences the outcome and thus has to be
compensated for that loss. The cheapest 61 senators to target are senators S40 to S100,
ranked on the basis of Ss(E) (since their ideological loss is perfectly correlated with
this). In previous sections we had established that no one is paid positive contributions
if not pivotal. However, in this section, senators face a cost that is dependent on their
vote, not on being pivotal. If the president deviates to o¤er a payment schedule in
which he zeroes out one of the 61 senators (one with Ss(E) < 0), then that senator
would not support the president and thus only 60 senators are voting for the proposal.
In this circumstance, every senator would be pivotal, and the president would have
to compensate each one of them for ideological loss, contribution loss, and personal
utility dependent on the outcome. But then the president would be spending more in
contributions by Assumption H1.
In stage one, the president has no deviation. He is proposing the policy that
maximizes his utility, net of contributions paid. He will never propose a candidate to
the right of J5 because that would increase the contributions paid to cover additional
ideological costs without shifting the outcome any further to the right.
There is no other equilibrium that contradicts claim 3. Suppose there were such a
candidate equilibrium. Then the president could deviate by playing the pivot strategy
of section 3.3, additionally compensating supporting senators for any ideological loss.
The president would make the following o¤er to 61 senators: "If you are pivotal, and
vote in favor of the proposal, I will compensate you for any outcome-dependent utility
loss you have, any contributions you would have received if you voted otherwise (in the
candidate equilibrium), and any ideological cost you incur. On top of that, I will give
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you "  0. If you are not pivotal, and vote for the proposal, I will compensate you
for any ideological cost you incur, and give you " on top of that. If you vote against
my proposal, I will give you nothing." To the remaining 39 senators the president
always o¤ers zero. Each of the 61 senators has the dominant strategy of voting for
the proposal. Hence, in equilibrium, 61 senators will be voting for the proposal and
no one will be pivotal. The president only has to compensate each senator for their
ideological loss, if any, plus ". This deviation by the president establishes that the
candidate outcome cannot be an equilibrium.
4 Extensions
In this section we explore several variations on our model. First we examine the possi-
bility of either the president or special interest groups conditioning their contributions
on the vote of a senator. Then we ask about o¤ers contingent on the nal outcome.
Finally, we examine the possibility that lobbyists make contributions directly to the
president in exchange for a nominee they prefer.
4.1 Contributions Conditional on a Senators Vote Only
In this subsection we restrict contributions to be conditional on the vote of each sen-
ator. We look only at the case in which we have both local lobbies and the president
attempting to inuence senatorial votes (since the instances where one or the other
of these do not make contributions are special cases). Given that there is a coordina-
tion problem between the president and the local lobbies sharing his preference, with
resulting multiple equilibria, we focus attention on the equilibria in which in stage 2
the president coordinates with the local lobbies that prefer his proposal to the reversion
policy and extracts the full surplus resulting from this coordination. So, if there is a case
in which the president alone is unable to recruit the necessary number of votes, but the
president together with the local lobbies with the same preferences could jointly recruit
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a su¢ cient number of votes, we assume that the president is capable of inducing the
lobbies to o¤er contributions to obtain the equilibrium the president prefers.
The strategy sets are as follows: the president proposes a nominee, JN , and o¤ers
contributions to senator s conditional on her vote, cps : f0; 1g ! R. As before, the
president can o¤er a contribution schedule to each senator. Each lobby o¤ers contri-
butions to its senator only, conditional on her vote, cls : f0; 1g ! R. Each senator
only observes contributions o¤ered to her, as well as her personal utility, and votes,
vs : R! f0; 1g:
The game proceeds as follows:
Stage 1. The president nominates a candidate, JN , that will result in policy E if
successful.
Stage 2. The president and the local lobbies simultaneously o¤er contributions to
each senator s conditional on her vote.20While the local lobbies cannot coordinate
among themselves, the president can impose coordination among the local lobbies
sharing his preferences. The president is free to o¤er contributions cps to any
senator, while each local lobby ls can only o¤er contributions to its corresponding
senator s.
Stage 3. Each senator observes the proposal and the contributions o¤ered to her
only and casts a vote. If the number of senators voting in favor of the proposal is
sixty or more, E is the nal outcome. Otherwise, the reversion policy r results.
Our equilibrium concept, as before, is pure subgame perfect Nash. We rene
equilibria to allow the president to coordinate local lobbies in order to extract the
maximum surplus. That is, using his asymmetric position, the president extracts the
full willingness-to-contribute from each lobby that prefers the nominee proposed. Local
20When writing out contributions o¤ered to a single senator, we order them with the contribution
o¤ered for vs = 1 rst; for example, cps = f5; 0g means the president o¤ers 5 for vs = 1 and 0 for
vs = 0.
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lobbies that prefer the proposed policy are willing to accept the coordination because
they would be (weakly) worse o¤ in its absence. The following claim characterizes our
results.
Claim 4 Order all senators according to LSs(E), where LSs(E) = Ls(E) + Ss(E).
Given a reversion policy r and generic proposal E, (r  E  E), there exists a
continuation equilibrium in which E is approved if P (E) 
100P
s=41
max[0; LSs(E)]: If
the president can impose coordination and extract the full surplus from the lobbies, the
reversion policy r can never arise when this su¢ cient condition is satised. Then, in
the rst stage, the president proposes argmaxJfP (E) 
100P
s=41
max[0; LSs(E)]g.21
The proof of this is in the appendix. We look at the continuation equilibrium given
a status quo and a proposal E  r. In stage 3 there is always an equilibrium in which
strictly more than 60 senators vote in favor of the proposal, and no contributions are
o¤ered. This is an equilibrium in which no senator is pivotal, hence no senator has
an incentive to deviate and no local lobby can inuence the outcome. The president
obtains his preferred policy for free, so he has no deviation. This equilibrium might be
one in which some senators are playing a weakly dominated strategy.
Another potential equilibrium is one in which senators are pivotal. Can the pres-
ident and the local lobbies (who prefer E over r) jointly recruit 60 senators? Absent
contributions from the president, each senator would vote based on her own pref-
erences and the contributions received by the corresponding local lobby. If a given
senator is against the proposal (Ss(E) < 0) but the corresponding local lobby is in
favor (Ls(E)  0) and is willing to o¤er contributions up to its maximum benet, then
the president needs to contribute only max[0; Ss(E)   Ls(E)] to secure senator ss
vote. Absent coordination, the local lobby might not be willing to o¤er any contri-
butions. However, if the president can impose coordination on the lobbies, then each
lobby will contribute a positive amount for a vote in favor of outcome E, since the
21Recall that E depends on J.
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contributions o¤ered are not wasted in a coordination failure. For those senators with
Ss(E)+Ls(E)  0, the president can o¤er zero contributions. For those senators with
Ss(E) + Ls(E) < 0, the president needs to contribute  [Ss(E) + Ls(E)] =  LSs(E).
In order for such an equilibrium to be sustainable, however, the president needs to be
willing to compensate all the cheapest necessary senators that would otherwise vote
against the proposal. Given the proposal E, senators are ranked according to LSs(E).
Then, senators in fS41;:::;S100g are the cheapest to recruit. The condition for E to
result in equilibrium will thus be P (E) 
100P
s=41
max[0; Ss(E) Ls(E)]. In stage 1, the
president applies constrained maximization and choses the best E among those that
would be approved, namely argmaxJfP (E) 
100P
s=41
max[0; LSs(E)]g. Recall that the
composition of the set fS41;:::;S100g may vary with E.
4.2 Contributions conditional on vote and ideological cost
We briey extend the previous subsection allowing for the possibility of an ideological
cost as dened in section 3.4: each senator with Ss(E) < 0 faces an ideological cost
of  I(JN   Ss) when voting for the presidents nominee. The strategy sets and the
game are as in the previous subsection.
Intuitively, the di¤erence here is that the president will have to compensate each
senator with Ss(E) < 0 for her ideological loss in order to recruit her vote. In section
3.4 the president was able to pay only the ideological cost,  I(JN   Ss), by locking
the senators into the voting prole in which no senator was pivotal. Senators thus
did not have to be compensated for their outcome-related loss. However, the pivot
strategy cannot be played when contributions are conditional on the vote rather than
the entire voting prole; the president cannot force an equilibrium in which no one is
pivotal. Therefore we focus on the equilibrium in which everyone is pivotal because
this equilibrium gives us a su¢ cient condition: if there exists an equilibrium in which
everyone is pivotal and a certain outcome bE is achieved, then no E < bE can result in
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any equilibrium. We argue that a modication of claim 4 holds. To facilitate this, we
introduce a new dummy variable:
d =
8><>:1 if Ss(E) < 00 otherwise :
Claim 5 Order all senators so that LSs(E)+dI(JN Ss) < LSs+1(E)+dI(JN Ss+1).
Then, given a reversion policy r and a generic proposal E, (r  E  E), there exists
a continuation equilibrium in which E is approved if
P (E) 
100P
s=41
fmax[0; LSs(E)] + dI(JN   Ss)g:
If the president can impose coordination and extract the full surplus from the lobbies,
the reversion policy r can never arise when this condition is satised. Then, in stage
1, the president proposes:
argmaxJ

P (E) 
100P
s=41
fmax[0; LSs(E)] + dI(JN   Ss)g

.
This claim follows from claim 4 and section 3.4, so an intuitive explanation will
su¢ ce. If every senator is pivotal, the president has to make sure every one of these
is at least indi¤erent between voting in favor of the proposed nominee and voting
against. In the previous section, absent ideological cost, he had only to compensate
the senator for whatever the local lobby failed to contribute: max[0; Ss(E) Ls(E)].
If the senator bears an ideological cost (i.e. if d = 1), the president will also have
to compensate her for this loss; therefore an additional I(JN   Ss) will have to be
paid. The cheapest set of 60 senators is now determined by this double compensation:
compensation for a senators ideological loss, if any, and compensation for the shortfall
from contributions from her local lobby. As in section 3.4 we conclude that no nominee
to the right of J5 will ever be proposed. We denote the equilibrium outcome of claim
5 as bE in order to make a comparison with other possible outcomes.
As in the previous section we admit the possibility of equilibria in which strictly
more than 60 senators vote for the proposal of the president, whatever this might be:
since no senator is pivotal, each senator would have only to be compensated for her
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ideological loss. These equilibria can have outcome E > bE. However, as long as the
conditions of claim 5 are satised and the president can impose coordination, no policy
to the left of bE will result in equilibrium. Even if we are in the gridlock region and
even if senators face an ideological cost when voting for the nominees proposal, the
president can ensure that the policy is moved at least to bE.
4.3 Contributions conditional on the outcome
In this subsection, we return to the case with no ideological cost and briey explore the
possibility of conditioning the contributions on the outcome. The president proposes
a nominee and o¤ers a contribution schedule to each senator s conditional on the
outcome: cps : fr; Eg ! R. Each lobby o¤ers a contribution schedule to its senator
conditional on the outcome, cls : fr; Eg ! R. Each senator observes her personal
utility, as well as contributions o¤ered to her only, and casts a vote, vs : R ! f0; 1g.
All the remainder of the game is as in section 4.1.
We argue that claim 4 holds only under the renement that no senator plays weakly
dominated strategies. In claim 4 we had shown that the president would pick the
preferred nominee among those that can be approved by exactly 60 senators through his
and lobbyistsjoint contributions. We now give some intuition for why this equilibrium
still exists, and also explain why the president and lobbies cannot guarantee that
senators will pick the voting prole that sustains this equilibrium unless we eliminate
weakly dominated strategies.
We look at the continuation game, given a reversion policy r and a generic E  r.
If contributions can be made conditional only on the outcome, each senator is exactly
indi¤erent on how to vote whenever she is not pivotal. If contributions were conditional
on the vote, as before, a non-pivotal senator could be induced to vote one way or
the other. However, this is not possible when contributions are conditional on the
outcome. If she is not pivotal, she cannot a¤ect the outcome by her vote and hence the
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contributions conditional on the outcome cannot break her indi¤erence. Thus, there
will always be an equilibrium (from which no senator has an incentive to deviate) in
which at least 41 senators vote against any given nominee and no contributions are
paid. However, this may involve some senators playing weakly dominated strategies.
If they were pivotal, they would be better o¤ switching their vote.
We look at the equilibrium in which every senator voting in favor of the proposal is
pivotal. As in section 4.1, the president would have to compensate each senator for her
personal outcome-dependent utility loss, if any, and the contributions she might be able
to receive if she votes against the proposal (and hence changes the outcome). In section
4.1, whenever the conditions of claim 4 were satised (P (E) 
100P
s=41
max[0; Ss(E)  
Ls(E)] and lobbyist coordination with the president), the reversion policy could never
have been an equilibrium. However, when contributions are conditional on the outcome,
the president cannot make it a dominant strategy for a senator to vote for the proposal.
In stage 3, each senator also considers the case in which she is not pivotal and she
cannot a¤ect the outcome. Since contributions are conditional on the outcome only,
neither the president nor the lobby can break her indi¤erence when she is not pivotal.
So, even if the conditions of claim 4 are satised, we could have an equilibrium in
which strictly more than 40 senators vote for the reversion policy and no one has a
deviation. In order to insure that the reversion policy will never be an equilibrium
under the conditions of the claim, we have to add a renement: no senator plays a
weakly dominated strategy.22
4.4 Lobbies Contribute to the President
When both the president and local lobbies can make contributions conditional on the
entire voting prole, we found that the local lobbies have no inuence. The president
can propose his preferred policy and obtain his preferred outcome for free. What,
22If weakly dominated strategies are available, then existence can be established, but not uniqueness
of the equilibrium characteristics.
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however, would happen if the local lobbies chose to contribute to the president instead?
Given that the president is able to impose his preferred outcome for free, the lobbies
might be better o¤ trying to inuence the president directly. In this event it is possible
that the equilibrium policy outcome is to the left of E. There is however a lower bound
on how much the policy might be moved to the left. According to Proposition 0 of
Rohde and Shepsle (2006), all possible policy outcomes lie between the preferred point
of the fourth and the fth justice of the eight-member Court, regardless of the nominee.
Thus, the upper bound given before is E = J5 , and we now dene E = J

4 to be the
lower bound.
The strategy space is as follows. Each lobby o¤ers contributions to the president,
cls(E); conditional on the equilibrium resulting from his proposal in stage 1, cls : R!
R. The president o¤ers contributions to senators, conditional on the voting prole,
cps : V ! R. Senators vote, after observing the proposal and the contributions o¤ered
to them, vs : R! f0; 1g. The timing is as follows:
Stage 1: Everyone observes r. Lobbies, simultaneously and non-cooperatively
o¤er a contribution schedule to the president, cls(E).
Stage 2: The president observes the contribution schedule and proposes a nominee
JN with resulting policy E, and o¤ers a contribution schedule cps to each senator
conditional on the vote prole.
Stage 3: Senators observe E and the contributions o¤ered to them only, and
simultaneously and non-cooperatively vote. If the number of senators voting in favor
of the proposal is sixty or more, E is the nal outcome; otherwise, reversion policy r
will result in equilibrium.
This model can have multiple equilibria, and describing them is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, we are interested in knowing if there exist equilibria in which
the lobbies can successfully move the policy to the left of E. We know already that in
stage 3 the presidents proposal will be approved for free: he can play the pivot strategy
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described in section 4.1. Given the continuation game of stage 3, stage 1 and 2 are
the description of a rst price menu auction. The whole game can be seen as one in
which multiple bidders (the lobbies) make o¤ers to a single auctioneer (the president),
who has decision power over the nal outcome. Since the set [E,E] is compact, and
the utility functions of lobbies and president are continuous over this set, we can apply
Theorem 2 of Bernheim and Whinston [1986].23 Theorem 2 tells us, in any Nash
equilibrium in which lobbies play a truthful strategy, that the auctioneer will select a
policy that maximizes the joint utility of all players.24 In other words, the equilibrium
outcome will be E = argmax[E;E]fP (E) +
P
s
Ls(E)g for any truthful strategy by the
lobbies.25
Depending on the shape of P (:) and Ls(:) and on the relative location of the pre-
ferred point of each lobby, the result might be to the left of E. For example, suppose
preferences were Euclidean, and the presidents preferred point P was at E, while
all lobbies had their preferred point at E: In other words, P (E) =  jE   Ej and
Ls(E) =  jE   Ej. Then, in equilibrium, the outcome would be chosen to be equal
to argmax[E;E]f jE  Ej+ 100[ jE  Ej]g < E. Note that, if the lobbies had chosen
to inuence the senators instead, as in section 3.3, they could not have a¤ected the
outcome in any way. In lobbying the president on the other hand, the lobbies might
be able to inuence the outcome.
5 Conclusion
We started with the observation in Rohde and Shepsle (2006) that a reversion policy,
r, in the gridlock region is an equilibrium when no contributions are permitted. This
means that no presidential nomination is conrmable, and thus the existing eight-
23For the reader familiar with Bernheim and Whinston [1986]: the set of bidders figMi=1 is our set
flsg100s=1, the set S is [E,E], the payo¤ function gi is our Ls(E) and the payo¤ function d is our  P (E):
The strategy fi corresponds exactly to our cls and the lower bound ki is equal to zero.
24See denition 1 of Bernheim and Whinston [1986].
25Intuitively, a contribution prole is truthful if contributions correctly reect the relative value of
preferences over the elements in the set

E;E

.
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member Court will remain in place. We then examined a world in which political
agents (local lobbyists, the president) could o¤er inducements to legislators to vote
contrary to their initial preferences. What would happen if only the president could
o¤er contributions conditional on the voting prole? We found a very extreme result:
in equilibrium, the president can propose any nominee, no matter how extreme, and
his preferred policy E is approved with zero contributions. Furthermore, this result is
unchanged even if we add local lobbies. That is, even if all senators and all lobbies
prefer the reversion policy to any nominee to its right, the president is still able to
obtain his preferred policy for free. This result is very strong. It relies, on the one
hand, on the capability of one party (the president) to inuence a group of legislators
by creating a prisonersdilemma that locks them into an equilibrium in which none of
them is pivotal. (This, in turn, depends on the presidents ability to condition on the
entire voting prole.) It also relies on the assumption that legislators are unable to
cooperate among themselves. Dal Bo (2000, 2006) and Console-Battilana (2005, 2006)
develop similar results in very di¤erent contexts.
We then explored other possibilities, summarized in Table 2. What if senators
su¤er an ideological cost for voting against their constituency? In that case, they
must be compensated to do so even if they are not pivotal. We found that extreme
nominees will no longer be proposed  in particular no nominee to the right of the
fth justice in the eight-member Court will ever be nominated. Depending on the
shape of the indi¤erence curves and on the distribution of senatorsideal points, the
nominee proposed by the president in the rst stage might yield a policy to the left
of E. However, local lobbies still have no impact, regardless of their willingness to
contribute.
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Lobbying Conditions Equilibrium
No lobbying r
Only president contributes
conditional on v
E. Any JN
Both contribute
conditional on v
E. Any JN
Both contribute
conditional on v
with ideological cost
JN = argmaxP (E) 
CPP
s=40
I(JN   Ss)
JN  J5
Both contribute
conditional on vs
argmax[E;E] P (E) 
100P
s=41
max[0; LSs(E)]
Both contribute
conditional on outcome
argmax[E;E] P (E) 
100P
s=41
max[0; LSs(E)]
Ls contribute to P(cond on E)
and P to Ss(cond on v)
argmax[E;E] P (E) +
P
s
Ls(E)
Table 2. Lobbying and Equilibrium: Results.
Conditioning on the entire voting prole is certainly rst-best for the president;
however, in the real world, this might be too complex or too implausible. Senators
might not respond favorably to contributions conditional on events outside their con-
trol, such as the votes of other senators. We thus explored the e¤ect of conditioning
contributions on the vote of each senator. While multiple equilibria can arise, we found
that the president can be sure to have his nominee pass the libuster hurdle as long
as he proposes argmaxfP (E) 
100P
s=41
max[0; LSs(E)]g. If the distribution of preferred
points of senators and legislators is su¢ ciently biased towards the left, the president will
not be able to impose his preferred policy and will have to pay positive contributions
in equilibrium. We noted that there always exists an equilibrium in which no senator
33
is pivotal and everyone votes for the proposal, regardless of how extreme this is. How-
ever, this is an equilibrium over which the president has no control (it results from each
senator voting in favor of the proposal when indi¤erent, even if this might be weakly
dominated). If contributions can be conditioned only on the outcome, the president is
worse o¤; he can not ensure that any policy satisfying P (E) 
100P
s=41
max[0; LSs(E)] is
approved, unless we restrict equilibria to the ones in which no senator plays a weakly
dominated strategy. Finally, we inquired whether lobbyists might not have another
strategic option when contributions are conditional on the entire voting prole. Given
that a local lobby never manages to have an impact on the outcome when lobbying its
senator under this assumption, we examined whether the lobby might be better served
by o¤ering inducements to the president instead. In the case in which the president
conditions the contributions to senators on the entire voting prole,we found that the
outcome might be moved to the left of E.
We started from a pivotal-politics literature that uncovered "too much gridlock."
As American politics has become more polarized, this gridlock problem has been ex-
acerbated. Yet one must ask whether it is really the case that nominees other than
the one lying exactly at r can be consistently blocked when r is in the gridlock region.
This is not consistent with our casual empirical impressions. Our paper has provided
several instances in which, through lobbying, the too-much-gridlock problem is miti-
gated.26 The nomination process described here provides a description of politics more
subtle than one limited to presidential proposing followed by senatorial preference rev-
elation in a super-majority decision making context. The politics of Supreme Court
appointments, like that surrounding policies a¤ecting trade about which Grossman
and Helpman (1994) so elegantly wrote, involves strategic attempts by a variety of
agents, including the president himself, to inuence senators faced with accepting or
26In the case of conditioning on the entire voting prole, we may have replaced one anomaly with
another solving the problem of too much gridlock but producing a world with too much presidential
power. Nevertheless, it is striking empirically how much deference is accorded many presidential
nominees, so perhaps we have in our results the kernel of an explanation for such deference.
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rejecting nominees. We expect further development of models integrating proposing,
inuencing, and voting to occupy us and others in the future.
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Appendix
Proof of claim 1
This is a special case of claim 2. After proving this latter claim, we show how claim
1 also follows.
Proof of claim 2
Existence of equilibrium
The following is an equilibrium. In stage 1 the president proposes a JN yielding E.
In stage 2 each lobby ls o¤ers cls = 0 8v 2 V , the president o¤ers cps = max[0; Ss(E)]
for all voting proles in which senator s is pivotal and votes for the proposal, and o¤ers
cps = 0 for all other voting proles. In stage 3 all senators vote for the proposal. No
senator has an incentive to deviate. Suppose senator s deviates to vs = 0. Since 99
senators continue to vote vs = 1, the outcome will still be E. But, since s is receiving no
contributions either when voting for or against the nominee (since she is not pivotal),
she would not be better o¤ by deviating.
No local lobby has an incentive to deviate. Suppose lobby ls deviated by o¤ering a
positive amount to senator s under certain voting proles v 2 V   V . If in any v the
remaining 99 senators do not all vote vs = 1, this schedule is o¤ the equilibrium path.
(Each lobby can only inuence the vote of her own senator, and deviations are holding
everything else constant.) It does not a¤ect the equilibrium outcome or payments;
hence there is no gain in this deviation. If in any v the remaining 99 senators all
vote vs = 1, then the outcome will still be E and lobby ls would be paying positive
contributions, denoted as cls. Lobby ls would gain Ss
 
E

+0 Ss
 
E
  cls < 0; hence
it would be worse o¤. Therefore local lobbies have no deviation.
The president has no protable deviation in stage 2, since he is obtaining his pre-
ferred outcome for free. Likewise, the president has no protable deviation in stage 1.
If he nominates a JN yielding outcome E < E, given the continuation game, this will be
approved at no cost and the utility change for the president would be P (E) P (E) < 0.
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Since E is the upper bound, there is no protable deviation for the president at all.
Uniqueness.
Suppose there were an equilibrium with either positive payments by the president
or outcome r. This candidate equilibrium would be characterized by a voting prole
bv, a contribution schedule for each local lobby bcls , and a contribution schedule for the
president bcps. We show there is a pivot strategy that the president can play, with the
result of having his proposal E approved at a cost of 61", with " > 0 arbitrarily small.
If we show such a strategy exists, then no equilibrium with (a) positive payments by
the president or (b) E rejected could exist. That is, for any candidate equilibrium
satisfying property (a) or (b), the president could deviate and play the pivot strategy.
This deviation would reduce his payments by choosing " to be smaller than previous
payments and would sustain E as the outcome, where P (E)  61" > P (r) = 0.
We are left to prove such a pivot strategy exists. Consider a generic senator s.
Dene bc0;v sls to be the contribution schedule o¤ered to senator s by lobby ls whenever
vs = 0 and the remaining 99 senators vote according to voting prole v s. (The prole
v s has 99 elements, each an element of the set f0; 1g. The set of proles (0; v s) 2
V has 299 elements.) The president can o¤er the following schedule to senator s:
v s vs Contributions cps
(a) If v s has strictly less than 59 voting 1 1 bc0;v sls + "
(b) If v s has exactly 59 voting 1 1 bc0;v sls + "+max[0; Ss(E)]
(c) If v s has strictly more than 59 voting 1 1 bc0;v sls + "
(d) For any other v s 0 0
Senator s has a dominant strategy, vs = 1. In (a), the outcome is r regardless
of the vote of senator s, and his net utility from choosing action vs = 1 rather than
vs = 0 is at least Ss(r) + bc0;v sls + "   Ss(r)   bc0;v sls = " > 0. It might be more ifbc1;v sls > 0. In (b) senator s is pivotal. If she votes 0, her utility is Ss(r)(= 0) +bc0;v sls . If she votes 1, her utility is at least Ss(E) + bc0;v sls + " + max[0; Ss(E)] =
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8><>:Ss(E) + bc
0;v s
ls + " if Ss(E)  0bc0;v sls + " if Ss(E) < 0 . Her net utility from voting 1 as opposed to voting
0 will be at least " > 0. In (c) the outcome is E regardless of the vote of senator s. Her
net utility from voting 1 as opposed to 0 is at least bc0;v sls +" bc0;v sls = " > 0. Therefore,
under any possible voting prole of the other senators, senator s has a higher payo¤
if she chooses action vs = 1. Suppose the president plays the pivot strategy with 61
senators. For 61 senators it will dominant to vote vs = 1; therefore the president will
only have to o¤er each one of them bc0;v sls + ", with v s having strictly more than 59
voting in favor. However, when strictly more than 59 senators other than s vote in
favor, a majority of senators is already voting 1, hence the vote of senator s is not
relevant senator s is not pivotal. By the renement, bc0;v sls = 0 for any such voting
prole. Therefore, the president would be playing the pivot strategy with 61 senators
and obtain his preferred outcome for 61".
Proof of claim 1
We now return to claim 1 and establish it as a special case of the previous result.
Existence of equilibria
The following is an equilibrium. In stage 1 the president proposes a nominee yielding
E. In stage 2 the president o¤ers cps = max[0; Ss(E)] for all voting proles in which
senator s is pivotal and votes for the proposal, and cps = 0 for all other voting proles.
In stage 3 all senators vote in favor of the nominee. This is an equilibrium by the
existence argument in claim 2.
Uniqueness
Suppose there were an equilibrium with either positive payments by the presi-
dent or outcome r. Call this the candidate equilibrium. But then the president could
deviate from the candidate equilibrium and make the following o¤er to senators in
fS40; :::; S100g: o¤er cps = max[0; Ss(E)] + " for each voting prole in which s votes
for the proposal and is pivotal, o¤er cps = " for each voting prole in which s votes
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for the proposal and is not pivotal, and o¤er zero for all other voting proles. To
senators in fS1; :::; S39g the president o¤ers cps = 0 8 v. Senators in fS40; :::; S100g
have a dominant strategy, vs = 1. The argument is as follows. If in the candidate
equilibrium they were not pivotal and voted against the proposal, they would obtain "
more by deviating. If in the candidate equilibrium they were pivotal and voted against
the proposal, they would again obtain " more by deviating. By playing this deviation,
the president induces at least 61 senators to vote for the proposal. But then, no one
is pivotal, and the president has to pay only 61". If in the candidate equilibrium the
outcome were r, now the outcome will be E and " can be chosen such that the devia-
tion is protable: " < P (E)
61
. If in the candidate equilibrium the outcome were E but
the president was paying total positive contributions x, the president can deviate and
reduce his contributions by picking " < x
61
.
Proof of claim 3
We use many of the arguments proved in claim 2; therefore we avoid repetition of
the same arguments, giving a more synthetic proof.
Existence of equilibria
The following set of strategies is an equilibrium. For any voting prole in stage 3,
each senator casts the vote that gives a higher utility. If the utility is the same, she
is indi¤erent. In stage 2, the following strategies are an equilibrium. The president
o¤ers cps = I(JN  Ss) to senators in fS40; :::; SCPg for all voting proles in which they
vote vs = 1 and are not pivotal; I(JN   Ss) + max[0; Ls(E)   Ss(E)] to senators
in fS40; :::; SCPg for all voting proles in which they vote vs = 1 and are pivotal;
max[0; Ls(E)   Ss(E)] to senators in fSCP ; :::; S100g for all voting proles in which
they vote vs = 1 and are pivotal; and zero for all other voting proles and all other
senators (for any voting prole). The lobbies play the following strategies. Lobbies
with Ls(E)  0 o¤er cls = min[Ls(E);max[0; Ss(E)]] for all voting proles in which
their senator is pivotal and votes vs = 1, zero for all other voting proles. Lobbies
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with Ls(E) < 0 o¤er min[ Ls(E);max[0; Ss(E)]] for all voting proles in which their
senator is pivotal and votes vs = 0, and zero for all other voting proles. In stage 1,
the president proposes the policy that maximizes his utility, net of contributions paid.
Equilibrium actions: senators in fS40; :::; S100g vote vs = 1 and senators in fS1; :::; S39g
vote vs = 0; the president pays I(JN   Ss) to senators fS40; :::; SCPg and zero to all
others; and each local lobby pays zero.
No one has an incentive to deviate. In stage 3, no senator will deviate: senators in
fS40; :::; S100g are made exactly indi¤erent between vs = 1 and vs = 0, while senators
in fS1; :::; S39g are not pivotal and hence cannot a¤ect the outcome. They receive zero
contributions for either vote, and they do not incur an ideological cost when voting in
accord with their constituency.
In stage 2, no lobby has an incentive to deviate. Since each lobby can inuence only
its senator and no senator is pivotal, no lobby can a¤ect the outcome. Therefore, since
no lobby is paying positive contributions, no lobby has a deviation. The president has
no incentive to deviate. If he deviates to contribute less to one of the pivotal senators
than in the equilibrium voting prole, the senator will switch vote, only 60 senators
will vote for the proposal and the president will have to spend more in contributions
by assumption H1.
Uniqueness
The president chooses JN = argmaxP (E(JN))  
CPP
40
I(JN   Ss) > 0.27 (If no JN
yields a positive result, the president proposes the reversion policy point.) We argue
that, given a proposal E that respects maximization in stage 1, there is no equilibrium
in which either the president pays
CPP
40
I(JN  Ss) +x, x > 0 or the proposal is rejected.
Suppose there were one, called the candidate equilibrium. Consider a generic senator
s. The candidate equilibrium includes an o¤er bcls for any possible voting prole. Denebc0;v sls to be the contribution schedule o¤ered to senator s by lobby ls whenever vs = 0
27Note that CP is a function of JN .
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and the remaining 99 senators vote according to voting prole v s. The president can
o¤er the following schedule to senator s, a pivot strategy creating a deviation from the
candidate equilibrium:
To senators v s vs Contributions cps
(a) fS40; :::; CPg
P
i6=s vi 7 59 1 bc0;v sls + "+ I(Jn   Ss)
(b) fCP + 1; :::; S100g
P
i6=s vi < 59 1 bc0;v sls + "
(c) fS40; :::; CPg
P
i6=s vi = 59 1
bc0;v sls + "+max[0; Ss(E)]+
+I(Jn   Ss)
(d) fCP + 1; :::; S100g
P
i6=s vi = 59 1 bc0;v sls + "+max[0; Ss(E)]
(e) fS1; :::; S39g 8 v s 1, 0 0
(f) fS40; :::; S100g 8 v s 0 0
with " < x
61
.
By the same argument as in the proof of claim 2, senators Ss 2 fS40; :::; S100g have
a dominant strategy; vs = 1. Since no senator is pivotal in this deviation, bc0;v sls = 0
in equilibrium by the renement. Therefore, the president has a protable deviation
from the candidate equilibrium. Thus, he can obtain his preferred outcome for 61" +
CPP
40
I(JN   Ss).
Proof of claim 4
We rst establish three additional claims, used in the proof.
Claim 6 In equilibrium,
1. neither the president nor a lobby makes a positive payment if the preferred out-
come is not chosen; and
2. neither a lobby nor the president makes a payment exceeding the net benet it
(he) gets from the outcome it (he) likes most if the preferred outcome is chosen.
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These results are apparent from a consideration of the motivation of any agent to
deviate. No agent has such a motivation in the circumstances given in this claim.
Claim 7 In equilibrium, a non-pivotal senator receives no contributions.
Suppose not. Any lobby ls (or the president) contributing to the non-pivotal senator
could eliminate the contribution without a¤ecting the outcome. She is not pivotal, and
other senators observe only the contributions o¤ered to them; hence their votes are not
a¤ected. The contributing agent is better o¤ deviating.
Claim 8 Given a nomination JN yielding outcome E (r  E  E), there always
exists a continuation equilibrium in which the proposal is approved by at least sixty-one
senators and no contributions are o¤ered.
Given JN and resulting outcome E, suppose vs = 1 for sixty-one senators, each
lobby o¤ers cls = (0; 0), and the president o¤ers cps = (0; 0) 8s. No senator has an
incentive to deviate since she neither receives a positive contribution no matter what
vote she casts, nor is she pivotal. Hence her vote cannot inuence her personal outcome-
dependent utility. No local lobby has an incentive to deviate, since its corresponding
senator is not pivotal. The president is obtaining his preferred outcome for free and,
since P (E)  P (r), he has no deviation.
We now prove claim 4.
Existence of the continuation game equilibrium
Order senators according to LSs(E). Given a reversion policy r and a generic
nomination yielding E s.t. r  E  E; and P (E) 
100X
s=41
max[0; Ss(E) Ls(E)]; there
exists a continuation equilibrium in which each player plays the following strategies:28
The president o¤ers cps = fmax[0; Ss(E) Ls(E)]; 0g to senators Ss 2 fS41; :::; S100g
and cps = f0; 0g to senators Ss 2 fS1; :::; S40g.
28Recall that cps and clsare ordered pairs with the rst element the contribution if vs = 1 and the
second element the contribution if vs = 0.
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Each lobby with Ls(E) > 0 and ls 2 fl41; :::; l100g o¤ers
cls = fmin[Ls(E);max[0; Ss(E)]]; 0g.
Each lobby with Ls(E) < 0 and ls 2 fl41; :::; l100g o¤ers cls = f0; Ls(E)g.
Each lobby with ls 2 fl1; :::; l40g o¤ers cls = f0; 0g.
Each senator plays the following strategy: whenever she is pivotal, she votes vs = 1
(vs = 0) if Ss(E) plus the total contributions o¤ered to vote for JN is strictly higher
(lower) than Ss(r) plus the total contributions o¤ered to vote against JN . If the sums
are equal, the senator is indi¤erent, and she can vote either way. Whenever she is not
pivotal, she votes vs = 1 (vs = 0) if the total contributions o¤ered to vote for JN are
strictly higher (lower) than the total contributions o¤ered to vote against JN . If the
contributions are equal, she is indi¤erent.
In equilibrium, the following actions are played. Senators Ss 2 fS1; :::; S40g play
vs = 0, senators Ss 2 fS41; :::; S100g play vs = 1. The president pays max[0; Ss(E) 
Ls(E)] to senators Ss 2 fS41; :::; S100g and pays zero to all others. Lobbies ls 2
fl1; :::; l40g pay zero contributions and lobbies ls 2 fl41; :::; l100g pay
min[Ls(E);max[0; Ss(E)]] if Ls(E)  0 and zero if Ls(E) < 0. To see that this is
an equilibrium, consider each stage of the game.
Stage 3. In stage three, no senator has an incentive to deviate:
 Senators Ss 2 fS1; :::; S40g are not pivotal and thus cannot a¤ect the outcome;
therefore, they have a personal outcome dependent utility of Ss(E) regardless of
their vote. They are o¤ered zero contributions for any vote; hence they have no
deviation from vs = 0.
 Each senator Ss 2 fS41; :::; S100g is pivotal, but she has no incentive to change
her vote since she is exactly compensated for any outcome-dependent utility loss
and lobbyist contribution (if any).
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Stage 2. In stage two, the president has no incentive to deviate. He has a positive
benet of P (E) 
100X
s=41
max[0; Ss(E) Ls(E)]; therefore he prefers the equilibrium to
paying nothing and obtaining r. Furthermore, he cannot reduce his contributions:
 Senators Ss 2 fS1; :::; S40g are not pivotal, therefore, by claim 7, they are paid
no contributions for equilibrium action vs = 0. Furthermore, the president has
no incentive to o¤er positive contributions for action vs = 1. If the senator
deviates, and supports the presidents nominee, the outcome is unchanged and
the president wastes the contribution paid.
 Senators Ss 2 fS41; :::; S100g are all pivotal. The president is payingmax[0; Ss(E) 
Ls(E)]. If max[0; Ss(E)   Ls(E)]  0, then the president is obtaining the
vote of the senator for free, therefore he has no deviation. If max[0; Ss(E)  
Ls(E)] > 0, positive contributions are paid. Suppose the president deviated to
o¤er fmax[0; Ss(E)   Ls(E)]   "; 0g. There are two cases: (a) Ls(E)  0 and
Ss(E) < 0 (therefore  Ss(E) > Ls(E)) and (b) Ls(E) < 0: (a) Contributions of-
fered by the lobby are fmin[Ls(E);max[0; Ss(E)]]; 0g = fLs(E); 0g. Therefore
the senator has a utility of Ss(E) Ss(E) Ls(E)+Ls(E)  " =  " if she votes
vs = 1 and a utility of 0 if she votes vs = 0. The senator would deviate to vote
vs = 0 and the nominee would be rejected. (b) Contributions o¤ered by the local
lobby are f0; Ls(E)g. The benet of the senator from voting vs = 1 would be
Ss(E) Ss(E) Ls(E) " =  Ls(E) ". The benets from voting vs = 0 would
be  Ls(E) > 0. Therefore, the senator would deviate to vs = 0 and the nominee
would be rejected.
 The president would never deviate to contribute more, since these contributions
would be wasted. Furthermore, the president cannot recruit a cheaper set of
senators, since he is already recruiting the cheapest set by our ranking of senators.
 No lobby has an incentive to deviate.Each lobby ls 2 fl1; :::; l40g is paying zero
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contributions and cannot a¤ect the outcome, because its senator is not pivotal.
Therefore, it has no deviation any positive contributions could only reduce its
welfare.
 Each lobby ls 2 fl41; :::; l100g has no incentive to deviate either. There are three
cases:
(a) Ls(E) > 0 and Ss(E) > Ls(E); therefore cls = fmin[Ls(E);max[0; Ss(E)]]; 0g
= fLs(E); 0g;
(b) Ls(E) > 0 and Ss(E)  Ls(E); therefore cls = fmin[Ls(E);max[0; Ss(E)]]; 0g
= fmax[0; Ss(E)]; 0g; and
(c) Ls(E) < 0, therefore cls = f0; Ls(E)g.
(a) The lobby does not deviate to o¤er more by claim 6. The lobby would be
worse o¤ by deviating to o¤er less, say Ls(E)   ". If it deviated, the senator
would have a benet of Ss(E)  Ss(E)   Ls(E) + Ls(E)   " =  " < 0 from
voting vs = 1 and a benet of 0 from voting vs = 0. Therefore, the senator would
deviate and the lobby would not be better o¤.
(b) There are two subcases: max[0; Ss(E)] = 0 and max[0; Ss(E)] > 0. If
max[0; Ss(E)] = 0, then no contributions are o¤ered by the lobby and the pre-
ferred outcome is obtained; therefore no deviation is protable. Ifmax[0; Ss(E)] =
 Ss(E), then Ss(E) < 0 and Ss(E)+Ls(E) > 0; therefore the presidents contri-
butions are fmax[0; Ss(E)  Ls(E)]; 0g = f0; 0g. If the lobby deviates to o¤er
f Ss(E)  "; 0g, then the senator deviates and the outcome changes: the payo¤
from voting vs = 1 is Ss(E) Ss(E)  " < 0, while the payo¤ from voting vs = 0
is zero. Thus the lobby does not have a protable deviation.
(c) The lobby does not obtain its preferred outcome. Given the presidents o¤er,
the lobby would have to o¤er strictly more than  Ls(E) to induce its senator to
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vote vs = 0. But then, even though the senator would deviate, the lobby would
be worse o¤. Therefore, the lobby has no deviation.
Uniqueness of the continuation game outcome
No equilibrium with outcome r can arise if P (E) >
100X
s=41
max[0; Ss(E)   Ls(E)]:
Suppose there were a candidate equilibrium in which the outcome were r. But then the
president could o¤er max[0; Ss(E) Ls(E)] + " to Ss 2 fS41; :::; S100g, picking " such
that P (E) 
100X
s=41
max[0; Ss(E)  Ls(E)] + 60". But then, Ss 2 fS41; :::; S100g would
vote for the proposed policy. The benets from voting for the proposed policy would
be at least max[  Ss(E)  Ls(E); 0] + "+ Ss(E) : There are two cases: (a) Ls(E)  0
and (b) Ls(E) < 0
(a)If Ls(E)  0, then, by the assumption that the president can extract the full
surplus from the local lobbies, a contribution of min[Ls(E);max[0; Ss(E)]] is added
to vote for the proposal.
If the senator is pivotal, the benets from voting for the proposal aremax[  Ss(E) 
Ls(E); 0]+ "+Ss(E)+min[Ls(E);max[0; Ss(E)]] > 0, while the benets from a vote
in favor of r are zero. If the senator is not pivotal, the gain from voting E as opposed
to r is max[  Ss(E)   Ls(E); 0] + " + min[Ls(E);max[0; Ss(E)]] > 0. Hence, it is
a dominant strategy for the senator to vote vs = 1: (Note that, if the president had
not extracted the full surplus from the local lobbies in the candidate equilibrium, the
candidate equilibrium itself would not have been an equilibrium.)
(b)If Ls(E) < 0, then, by claim 6, the most that the senator could be o¤ered to
vote vs = 0 would be  Ls(E). Given the o¤er of the president, if the senator is pivotal
and votes for the proposal, her benet is max[  Ss(E) Ls(E); 0]+ "+Ss(E) which is
strictly higher than the benet from voting vs = 0,  Ls(E) + 0; therefore the senator
would vote for the proposal. If the senator is not pivotal and votes for the proposal, his
benet is max[  Ss(E)  Ls(E); 0] + ", which is still strictly higher than  Ls(E) + 0.
Therefore, it is a dominant strategy for the senator to vote for the proposal.
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Therefore, at least 60 senators would be voting for the proposal and the pro-
posal would result in equilibrium. The president would be better o¤ since P (E) >
100X
s=41
max[0; USs(E)   Ls(E)]. Hence, r can never result in equilibrium because the
president has a strategy that makes him better o¤ and results in the proposal being
approved.
Given the continuation equilibrium described above, in stage 1 the president chooses
the policy that maximizes his utility net of contributions,
argmaxJ P (E) 
100X
s=41
max[0; Ss(E)  Ls(E)] (recalled that E is a function of J).
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